In 1828, in the course of delivering his famous speech on law reform to the House of Lords, Henry Brougham identified "the difficulty… arising of necessity from our distance"
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The difficulty… arising of necessity from our distance, an unavoidable incident to our colonial empire, may almost be deemed an incapacity, for it involves both ignorance of the law, and unfitness to judge of the facts.
Henry Brougham

The Difficulty
In 1828, in the course of delivering his famous speech on law reform to the House of are thus made the supreme judges, in the last resort, over every one of our foreign settlements, whether situated in those immense territories which you possess in the East; where you and a trading company together rule over not less than seventy millions of subjects; or are established among those rich and populous lands which stud the Indian Ocean, and form the great Eastern Archipelago; or have their stations in those lands, part lying within the Tropics; part stretching towards the Pole, peopled by various castes differing widely in habits, still more widely in privileges; great in numbers, abounding in wealth, extremely unsettled in their notions of right, and excessively litigious, as all the children of the New
World are supposed to be, both from their physical and political constitution. All 3 this immense jurisdiction over the rights of property and person, over rights political and legal; and all the questions growing out of such a vast and varied province, is exercised by the Privy Council unaided and alone. It is obvious that, from mere distance of those colonies, and the immense variety of matters arising in them, foreign to our habits, and beyond the scope of our knowledge, any judicial tribunal in this country must, of necessity, be an extremely inadequate court of review.
This was challenging enough; but Brougham went on to explain that there were further problems:
what adds incredibly to the difficulty is, that hardly any two of the colonies can be named which have the same law; and in the greater number the law is wholly unlike our own. In some Settlements, it is the Dutch law; in others the Spanish, in others the French, in others the Danish. In our Eastern possessions these variations are, if possible, yet greater: while one territory is swayed by the Mohammedan law, another is ruled by the native or Hindu law, and this again, in some of our possessions, is qualified or superseded by the law of Budda, the English jurisprudence being confined to the handful of British settlers, and the inhabitants of the three presidencies. All these laws must come, in their turns, in review, before the necessarily ignorant privy councillor, after the learned doctors in each have differed.
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"The difficulty thus arising of necessity from our distance", he concluded, "an unavoidable accident to our colonial empire, may almost be deemed an incapacity, for it involves both ignorance of the law, and unfitness to judge of the facts." 2 Brougham's identification of the difficulty of distance as the Privy Council's major -and, one could almost say, its defining -weakness was a characteristically perceptive insight. As the passage read as a whole makes clear, he was not making a mundane point about the length and expense of journeys that litigants and their representatives might have to undertake in order to attend a hearing of the Privy Council; nor was he seeking to emphasise the delays in litigation that such journeys would inevitably cause. "Distance" was being used as much figuratively as literally: it was not so much the physical distance in itself that mattered, as the remoteness, unfamiliarity and sheer foreignness that the physical distance entailed. There were unique governmental arrangements to contend with, dramatic contrasts in the distribution of wealth, and enormous variations in climate, all of which were significant in themselves and shaped the habits and expectations of the inhabitants. A court merely seeking to apply English law principles to such very diverse societies would already have faced some nice problems calling for sophisticated and sensitive solutions. As it was, the task was even more delicate: Privy Council members were required to adjudicate on questions of whatever law happened to be in force in the jurisdiction from which the appeal had been brought. As the British Empire grew, so did the number of legal systems from which questions might come to the Privy Council. Brougham's catalogue of systems illustrated the eclectic demands of the Privy Council's remit in the early nineteenth century; and life was no simpler for early twentieth century members of the Judicial Committee. As Frederick Pollock recorded in 1906, the Privy Council could be required to pronounce on systems as diverse as Quebec's "essentially French law and procedure", the Isle of Man's "peculiar body of laws of 2 Ibid col 155.
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ancient, apparently Scandinavian origin" and "the possible variations of Hindu law by special custom" applicable in India. 3 Mauritius and the Straits Settlements presented different problems, as they blended English law with other elements. 4 Brougham regarded the difficulty of distance as so severe that it might "almost be deemed incapacity". At first glance the claim looks exaggerated -the Privy Council's "capacity", we might be tempted to reply, was determined by British constitutional arrangements in which any difficulty of distance was irrelevant. Brougham, however, was surely using the idea of incapacity in a more evaluative and illuminating way, to denote the Privy Council's ability to carry out its role as the Empire's court of final appeal. Taken in this sense, the implications of the difficulty of distance were indeed formidable, because they prevented the Privy Council from being able to rely on two traditionally compelling bases for recognising a court's (moral) authority. The first was technical expertise: as Brougham recognised, it was simply not possible to claim superior knowledge on the part of Privy Council members when appeals could be brought from such an eclectic array of jurisdictions. The second basis was social solidarity, an idea which was particularly powerful in a common law system, where -at least in theory -the law was thought to be grounded in social acceptance. Again, it was not obviously plausible for the Privy Council to be claiming to be in touch with the relevant society's needs and aspirations -the court was, by definition, remote from the society to which its pronouncements would apply. In short, the difficulty of distance had the potential to undermine both the court's moral authority and the credibility of its judgments.
3 F Pollock, 'The Jurisdiction of the Privy Council ' (1906) In the Privy Council the theory has always prevailed that when the Board is hearing an Appeal from any dependency of the Crown, it is in effect sitting as a Court of that dependency, and local counsel can appear subject to exactly the same conditions as those under which they could appear in the Court appealed from.
Such equivocation -to be in London in reality and elsewhere in "theory" -was also, apparently, achieved by the best judges. Sir James Colvile was praised for his "instinct to survey a question with the eyes at once of an Englishman and a Hindoo". 
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Council's decision of any sympathy with the idea that self-government was conditional, or revocable. These provisions, which are manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of the officer, are inconsistent with importing into the contract of service the term that the Crown may put an end to it at its pleasure. In that case they would be superfluous, useless, and delusive. This is, in their Lordships' opinion, an exceptional case, in which it has been deemed for the public good that a civil service should be established under certain regulations with some qualification of the members of it, and that some restriction should be imposed on the power of the Crown to dismiss them.
Gould v Stuart
25
The Crown was not to be allowed to fall back on its arbitrary common law powers when it had previously found it expedient to sign those powers away. allowing the Crown to be sued, but the argument was better received than it had been in the earlier case. Here, the Privy Council emphasised, the case was different, because a local
Ordinance of 1868 had recognised -albeit in general language -that such actions could be brought. Counsel for the Crown had suggested that some clearer statutory language was needed, and had emphasised that allowing claims against the Crown would be a radical departure from Ceylon's Roman-Dutch roots, since it was "impossible" to suppose, in that system, that the monarch would "submit to the indignity of being sued". 30 The Privy 26 (1881) 6 App Cas 619. 
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Council's response was striking. Sixteenth century Scots procedural law, they pointed out, permitted the king to be sued via his officers -claims were thus not only possible, but had actually occurred -and, whilst it was true that no reported instances of claims against the monarch in Roman-Dutch law could be found, the absence of such claims was readily explicable by political circumstances rather than legal principles. 31 In Ceylon, where claimants were less inhibited, the denial of a right to sue for breach of contract would be "inconvenient", because the petition of right procedure -which was the means by which English claimants were able to bring contractual claims against the Crown -had never been extended to Ceylon. 32 These historical and contextual factors cast new light on the Ceylonese courts' practice of allowing claims: "Whatever may be the exact origin of the practice of suing the Crown, it was doubtless established to avoid such glaring injustice as would result from the entire inability of the subject to establish his claims".
33
The most striking features of the Privy Council's analysis here were its emphases on empiricism, relativism and local context. The apparently eternal truth that no monarch would submit to the indignity of actions in ordinary courts was first undermined by historical evidence, then repositioned as a statement of contingent political reality rather than legal principle, and finally declared inapplicable to Ceylon. It was an analysis that worked by methodically distancing itself from a proposition that was axiomatic for English lawyers (and would continue to be so until the Crown Proceedings Act 1947), and by substituting a rule that was responding to local conditions.
The relativity of self-evident constitutional truths came to the fore in the final two cases of the cluster. Both concerned the proposition -it was almost a slogan -that "the King could do It must be borne in mind that the local Governments in the Colonies, as pioneers of improvements, are frequently obliged to embark in undertakings which in other countries are left to private enterprise, such, for instance, as the construction of railways, canals, and other works for the construction of which it is necessary to employ many inferior officers and workmen. If, therefore, the maxim that "the king can do no wrong" were applied to Colonial Governments in the way now contended for by the appellants, it would work greater hardship than it does in England.
The essential point in this passage was the same as the point made by Faucett J in the court below, but, when the two expositions are placed side by side, two telling differences can be seen. First, there is a difference in assumed audience. Faucett J speaks of "the state of things existing here", and is implicitly addressing fellow Australians. The Privy Council seems to have a different audience in view -the analysis is couched in terms of justifying a departure from traditional English precepts, and "It must be borne in mind…" sounds like an attempt to forestall implicitly English objections. The assumed audience here is a sceptical English one.
The second difference is the breadth of the reasoning. Where Faucett J speaks of "the Colonial Government", the Privy Council talks of "the local Governments in the Colonies"; where the Privy Council was far more respectful of New South Wales' autonomy than its own Chief Justice had been -but the determination to support colonial self-determination was both consistent and admirable. There was also quite a radical undertone to some of the jurisprudence. For, even though the cases were technically limited to the interpretation of foreign legislation, the Privy Council's underlying scepticism about Crown immunity from claims in contract and tort was obvious. In some ways the most challenging aspect of these decisions was not so much their rationes as their invocation of increasing government activity to support the conclusion that Crown immunities had been abandoned: the implication was, that, far from being universal or self-evident truths, Crown immunities were contingent on political environments. That was a message with quite startling implications beyond the colonial context.
Colonial Experience
The cases discussed in the previous section did not only share common ideas; they were heard by very similarly constituted panels. neither of which could be obviously explained by its mundane, rather pedestrian provisions.
As both its history and the debates surrounding it demonstrated, however, the proposal to appoint four new judges to the Privy Council, and even the terms of the new appointments, brought to the surface some of the conflicting aspirations, ideologies and fantasies about the Privy Council that were normally left to swirl around its operations unarticulated. At the heart of these disputes were questions about technical expertise, professionalization and the symbolic significance of remuneration for Privy Council judges.
What made such legislation necessary was the number of Privy Council appeals from India, which had climbed so steeply in the 1860s as to overwhelm the Privy Council's working methods. 64 In 1870 64 Howell, Judicial Committee (n 6) explains the underlying causes of the increase at 112-118.
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productivity: pursuant to s 1 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833, the majority of its members already held high judicial offices that occupied most of their time.
The obvious solution was to reinforce the Privy Council with judges who could devote their energies to clearing the backlog, and in July 1870 Lord Hatherley LC introduced a Bill into the House of Lords which was designed to achieve that result. 65 The Bill provided for the appointment of four new members of the Judicial Committee. Two were to be either former judges of any High Court in India or a former Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, and were to receive a salary of £1,000. The second two were to be either former judges of the Supreme Court of any possession other than India, or barristers of at least fifteen years'
standing. These second two judges were each to receive £2,500 a year in salary. The Bill also provided for the appointment of retired English judges, at a salary of £500 a year. Hatherley clearly anticipated that the details of his proposals would be controversial: as he introduced the Bill for its Second Reading, he was already prepared to restrict the Indian judicial qualifications to former Chief Justices, since, as he explained, "There had been intimated to him some objections with reference to the appointment in the first instance of the Judges in any Court in India, and it had been suggested that in some Courts there were native Judges whom it would not be desirable to appoint as members of the Judicial Committee."
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Lord Cairns immediately voiced different anxieties. For him, the eligibility of even former Chief Justices of smaller colonies went too far: "the consequences", he pointed out, "might be the appointment of the Chief Justices of Sierra Leone, the Straits Settlements, Gambia, the Mauritius, or any of the Colonies whose Chief Justices were of a different stamp from those whom it was desirable to appoint on the Judicial Committee". 67 This was hardly flattering to the current holders of those posts. The proposal to pay £500 to retired English judges was also objectionable, but for different reasons. There was, he said, "an ample scale of retiring pensions for Judges, and attached to the receipt of those pensions there was always considered to be the obligation -no doubt an imperfect one -to give some portion of their time to the transaction of the judicial business of the country". 68 Introducing a practice of payment, he concluded, would destroy "the honourable understanding which now prevailed".
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Before we go on to consider how the 1870 Bill fared in subsequent debates it is worth pausing to register the significance of the proposals and the immediate moves responding to them. As it stood the Bill was very obviously shaped by anxieties about the difficulty of distance. The emphasis on former Indian judges was partly explained by the severe backlog of Indian appeals, but the intention to appoint two such judges alongside judges from other colonies showed that, at least in some quarters, there was a belief that what the Privy Council needed was an infusion of new members with colonial experience. Hatherley's concession on Indian judges, and Cairns' concerns about colonial Chief Justices suggested a contrasting underlying conception of the Privy Council. For them it was not all about local knowledge and experience, nor could it be about making the Privy Council a kind of facsimile of an appellate court for whichever jurisdiction an appeal came from -it that were so, the native judges and colonial chief justices would have been a perfect fit. What exactly Lord Hatherley and Lord Cairns had in mind is more difficult to pin down. Their objections could, it is true, simply be read as expressions of racism and intellectual snobbery respectively, but it might 67 HL Deb 18 th July 1870 vol 203, col 406.
68 HL Deb 18 th July 1870 vol 203, cols 406-7.
be possible -and also more interesting -to relate their concerns to the difficulty of distance.
Both men could be seen as saying that over-enthusiastic attempts to eliminate distance would be counter-productive, and result in the appointment of individuals who were either partisan, or unable to appreciate the Privy Council's role as an imperial institution, in which breadth of view and an awareness of political sensitivities were at least as important as technical expertise. They may, in short, both have felt that a certain distance was essential for the Privy Council to perform its role.
When the House of Lords considered the Bill at the Committee stage, attention focussed on its financial aspects. Like Lord Cairns, Lord Romilly opposed the proposal to pay retired English judges £500 a year, but his reasons were very different from Lord Cairns'. Romilly's basic position was that there was a direct relationship between remuneration and quality of service, and it was "perfectly ridiculous" to think that £500 would be enough to secure judges "such as would inspire confidence among the public and the profession both at home and abroad". 70 He also had his doubts about whether £2,500 would be enough to tempt barristers of the requisite calibre away from practice. 71 Lord Cairns agreed, pointing out that English puisne judges currently received £5,000; if £2,500 was an adequate attraction, he added, mischievously, "the judicial salaries paid in this country ought at once to be reduced by onehalf". 
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barristers had resulted in that part of the Bill being dropped. But what was left was still controversial. The Bill, it was said, "went to degrade one of the greatest Courts in the country" 74 , and would make an addition to the Privy Council which "was not equal to the elements of which it is now composed". 75 Henry James MP (later, as Lord James of Hereford, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) singled out the proposal to include former Law Members of the Viceroy's Council -"With the greatest respect to Mr Maine", he said, using that formula that lets listeners know to brace themselves for something disrespectful, "a gentleman whose great learning was admitted, he could not think that the proposal to put among the Judges of the Judicial Committee a gentleman who had had no judicial experience was at all a satisfactory one". 76 Hobhouse's universally acclaimed service on the Judicial Committee in the last two decades of the nineteenth century would put such casual dismissals in their proper light.
A more considered, compelling attack on the Bill came from Watkin Williams MP. Like his colleagues, he feared that the proposals would diminish the Privy Council's status, but, rather than confining himself to vague generalisations, he was careful to explain why he thought that the current court had such high standing. The Judicial Committee, he said, had exercised its functions not only to the satisfaction of the suitors, but had so advised the Crown in its actions as to place the Committee in the very foremost rank as an appellate tribunal. Its advice and reports were held both in America and France, as well as in England, as judgments of the highest legal authority; and he ventured to say that there was no Appellate Court in the world -none certainly in England -that could for one moment stand side by side as regarded reputation 74 Ibid cols 1717-8 (Mr Vernon Harcourt).
75 Ibid col 1714 (Mr Henley).
76 Ibid cols 1715-6.
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with that great Court. There was no pretence for saying that the House of Lords could be compared with the Judicial Committee in that respect; perhaps one reason was that the Judicial Committee gave their advice to the Crown upon grounds of plain justice and common sense unfettered by technicalities.
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The trouble with the Bill, he explained, was that it made belonging to this distinguished tribunal "a matter of money":
Men of the greatest attainments looked to this position as the highest distinction that could be conferred upon them in recognition of public services, great learning, and proved judicial qualifications. But, by making it a question of money, the whole system was altered, and the existing attraction done away with… There was something which, even to lawyers, was more than money, and that was the honourable recognition of the legal ability, learning, and judicial qualifications requisite for the highest appellate tribunal.
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Watkin Williams' assessment of the Privy Council, and his criticism of the Bill's proposals were highly suggestive. The Privy Council was depicted as enjoying an enviable international prestige, even in jurisdictions that fell outside its remit, and as being unquestionably ahead of 
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and the differences in great measure disappear. The master of legal principle who has a mind large enough to be free from provincialism is, therefore, in all cases the best kind of judge.
93
Haldane was speaking in 1900, and, given the relatively recent controversies surrounding the appointment of colonial judges to the Privy Council, his remarks are particularly striking:
rather than regretting the loss of specialist expertise among the judges, expertise was here being presented as inhibiting, narrowing, and halfway to provincialism.
Twenty years later, in a similar address, Haldane returned to the same theme:
The Judges try to look for the common principle underlying systems of jurisprudence of differing kinds. They know that the form often veils over a very similar substance. We are constantly finding that, where great broad principles of justice are concerned you find -veiled, but still there, and only distinguished by technicalities -the same substance as belongs to other systems. The human mind is much the same all the world over.
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In some ways this passage is even more suggestive than his earlier remarks. He was now a judge -hence the slide from the third person to the first -and though he began his talk with some light-hearted comments about keeping the Privy Council's secrets, he obviously found the occasion congenial, and it may be relevant that he had not planned to publish the text of what he said. 95 His comments showed how far he was from thinking that specialism, or expertise in a particular system, were advantages: on the contrary, an immersion in the technicalities was to be avoided, and the veils thrust aside. The last sentence of the passage 
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was particularly resonant: if the universal identity of the human mind was the starting point, the difficulty of distance disappeared.
The attraction of appealing to universal principles of justice was particularly strong when social conditions and legal concepts were remote from those applying in England. Two examples from the Indian appeal cases on duress and undue influence show how such universal concepts could be invoked, with varying degrees of success. In Prem Narain Singh v Parasram Singh 96 the appellants sought to set aside an agreement under which they had transferred a half share of property inherited from their grandfather to their uncles and cousins. The property had previously been held by the appellants' grandmother; after her death, the defendants arrived with a large body of retainers, and took possession. There were "serious apprehensions of affray" 97 , and government officers had to be sent to keep the peace. A "punchayet" was then held, at which the arbitrators were the father-in-law of the eldest appellant and two neighbouring "zemindars". None of the Indian terms were explained in the Privy Council's reasons, but a punchayet was a kind of mediation, and a zemindar a local landowner. The outcome of the punchayet was an ikrarnamah (again, unexplained in the reasons -it meant a formal undertaking) to transfer the half-share. The appellants then went before a criminal court, where they made depositions stating that they had been charged with unlawful assembly, that they denied the charge, and that the transfer of the property had been made as a compromise. Having explained the facts, the Privy Council then proceeded to apply the law:
Looking at the whole case, the main features of it appear to be these: These young men execute a deed, whereby they part with a half of their property. Lordships' view, executed without any consideration whatever. It is executed very shortly after they had come to their property, and when it may be considered as at all events doubtful whether they were fully acquainted with their rights;
indeed the evidence in the case tends to shew that they were not fully acquainted with their rights. At the time of the execution of a most important document they do not appear to have had any professional advice; and, further, the appearance of their uncles with a large force, the possession which was taken of their property, the criminal proceedings, and the other circumstances which have been referred to, constituted a state of things likely to overawe them, and materially to affect the free exercise of their will.
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The effect of this paragraph is a linguistic jolt. Up to this point the events had been described in a way which made no concessions to readers unfamiliar with Indian terminology. But when it came to the legal analysis, the "main features" of the case were articulated in such classical English legal language as to sound faintly ridiculous. There is also a troubling sense that by forcing the factual situation into English legal categories the "main features" of the case were misidentified as being all about the appellants' exercise of their contractual freedoms. A different way of characterising the case would have focussed on the appellants' attempts to renege on the outcome of a local mediation. Indeed, it might be tempting to say that the "main feature" of the case was the delicate issue about the extent to which different, However, at the same time, great care was taken to signal that the judges appreciated the importance of local conditions. One of the arguments that had been addressed to them was that since the Burmese officer's imprisonment of the agent was lawful, the buyer could not rely on it as duress. The judges' response to this argument was quick to distinguish between England and Burma:
in this country if a man is under lawful imprisonment for a civil debt, an agreement which he makes while subject to that constraint is not, by reason of his being so subject to it, capable of being avoided, provided that it is not unconscionable. But imprisonment in a country where there is no settled system of law or procedure, and where the judge is invested with arbitrary powers, is duress of a wholly different kind. In the one case the prisoner knows that the 99 (1876) LR 3 Ind App 61.
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length and severity of his imprisonment are defined and limited by the law, and cannot be exceeded; whereas in the other the prisoner neither knows what will be the length of his imprisonment, nor what amount of pain and misery he may be put to; all is indefinite; and therefore the apprehension acting on the mind of a man in such a situation would be infinitely greater than if he were imprisoned in a country like England, where the law is settled, and cannot be exceeded by the Judge.
101
The sale was, therefore, held to be void.
Part of what made Moung Shoay Att v Ko Byaw a more convincing performance than
Premain Narain Singh v Parasram Singh was its tone: the universal contractual principle on which reliance was to be placed was put forward almost diffidently, and wrapped in the reassuring acknowledgement that local law was paramount. There were no such presentational niceties in Singh's case, where English legal categories were simply imposed.
Of equal, perhaps greater importance, was the superior way in which Moung Shoay Att v Ko
Byaw negotiated the difficulty of distance. In Singh's case the facts were in Bengal, and the law was in London; but in Moung Shoay Att v Ko Byaw the judgment was nimbler, shuttling astutely between anglicised universal principles and Burmese particularities to craft an analysis that was strengthened by its interweaving of different strands.
Policy
For a court to be undertaking the identification and exposition of universal principles was, perhaps, unusual enough; but the Privy Council's frequent and unabashed engagement with
